


Toolkit 6: Working Against Violent Extremism, Radicalisation and Organised Terrorism in Higher Education






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Introduction:


This toolkit was written as part of the CHECK IT HE project, which was co-funded by the European Union Erasmus+ Programme and led by Birmingham City University. It is one of a series of resources on addressing hate and extremism in higher education institutional (HEI) contexts, available from the project web pages online at: **CHECKIT HE – Countering Hate and Extremism on Campus - School of Social Sciences | Birmingham City University (bcu.ac.uk)** This toolkit focuses on the crucial issue of serious and violent extremism and its relationship with, and potential incursion into, HEI campuses and educational organisations. The need for this output is evidenced through European Union policy documents and initiatives around extremism, the duty that HEIs across Europe are increasingly expected to perform in addressing extremism and hate and media and public concerns about these issues.

In the preceding toolkits of the CHECK IT HE project, a range of areas around extremism and hate have been examined. It is often raised that that extremism on campuses is relatively rare or based on individuals who do not appear to have wider impact – in other words, that there is little consequence or importance to hate and extremism on campus. However, Khan Bangash (2017), writing about Pakistan’s HEI system, notes that such complacency and lack of recognition of the wider organised aspects of violent extremism is naïve as the stakes and potential risks of such activity for HEIs and societies are high.

“Extremism on campuses is not a numbers game. I have often heard apologists claiming that the percentage of extremists in universities is small ... The issue is not with the percentage but with the existence itself. It does not take a large percentage of extremists to terrorise a population, nor does it take a large number of terrorists to kill scores of people. One suicide bomber can kill hundreds, and one bully can intimidate a whole cross section of students. Therefore, let us not skirt around the issue with numbers. Yes, extremists and potential terrorists are few in number on university campuses, but even that small percentage is worrisome.” Khan Bangash, (2017, n.d. online). <https://dailytimes.com.pk/116285/extremism-in-universities/>

Bangash notes that despite the actual numbers of actual reported events of violent hate and extremism on HEI campuses being low, the case of the promotion of violent hate and extremism and potential risk to HEIs and the general public is severe/high. As noted by the European Parliament (2021), HEIs can be attractive as places to attempt to recruit and influence students towards violent hate and extremism on campus, or student might be influenced within the wider communities around or online, whilst being students. HEIs typically have STEM subject departments or faculties where students can study subjects that potentially could provide knowledge and competencies enabling them to orchestrate extremist acts (for instance, Chemistry or Computing). However, the fact remains that HEIs are places where there are young people might be radicalised and drawn into violent hate and extremism from across diverse subject and disciplinary areas.





Any incursion of extremism and hate onto campuses could have a profound impact on students themselves, the wellbeing of the whole campus community and institution, the integrity of HE, on wider communities across societies and wider public safety. Therefore, it is a matter that all HEI staff, across institutional sections, need to know about and be aware about.

Audiences for the Toolkit

The main audiences for use of this toolkit are all those who work in HEIs, including lecturers, teachers and tutors, operational and strategic managers and leaders, counselling staff and welfare and diverse service department staff. As can be seen, it is not just those who teach in a face-to-face context that will be interested in the content offered here. Diverse HEI staff will benefit in learning about the key issues and responses. Other interested groups that the CHECK IT HE project team envisage can gain from using this resource are officers and others working in Students Unions, along with representatives of youth organisations at national and pan-European levels, and NGO staff who collaborate with HEIs in relation to youth issues and/or extremism. Another key target group is HE and wider youth and education policy makers, working at national and EU levels, who are charged with supporting policy change to address the highly charged and urgent area of the growth of organised extremism and its influence on campuses. Working against violent extremism effectively, involves cutting across sectors and bringing different players together to find solutions to complex and urgent problems.


This resource will demonstrate how innovative partnership working is often required to counter serious extremism on campus. This output is pivotal and vital in directly addressing the organised elements of extremism on HEI campuses across Europe and enabling participants to be able to enhance their practice and skills, introducing innovative methods of responses to this critical set of issues. It will gather illustrations and cases that demonstrate the range of innovative ways that the issues can be challenged to build the toolkit and make it current and relevant. Participants who have used the other toolkits and read the report in Output 1, will have learned that there is a broad range of activities, motivations and issues involved in violent hate and extremism on HE campuses and their communities/societies around. This toolkit builds on that knowledge to expand understanding of what is meant by violent extremism. As the focus of the output is violent extremism, including examining proscribed groups, radicalisation and potential responses, the output may be of interest to a host of groups.

By the end of the toolkit, the aim is that you will:

- Understand terminology around violent extremism and the way these terms are used in different contexts and are contested,
- Be better able to locate debates around extremism within policy frameworks and be able to identify how this potentially might impact on your work and experiences,
- Understand radicalisation and how this process might impact on your work and HEI,
- Feel more able to explain concepts around violent extremism to colleagues, students, and others,
- Feel more confident to be able raise and start discussions around violent extremism and preparedness in your HEI,

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


- Have reflected upon when to refer situations or issues that potentially may relate to extremism in your work to other colleagues or the organisation,
- Feel better able to ask your organisation about violent extremism preparedness and contribute to debate and possibly action to ensure planning in relation to this.

This output will make explicit links to themes and issues already raised in the other toolkits and we would encourage you to examine more of these to build your knowledge in the field.

Please contact the CHECK IT HE team if you would like to discuss any issues raised here further, or if you would like to add aspects of your own practice or experience to the wider online resources on our webpage.





Section 1: A Starting Point for this Resource - What is Extremism?


There is no single pathway towards extremism, violence, and acts of terrorism, instead there are a range of factors that lead to such incidents. Extremism has become a nebulous term with many different interpretations and definitions of what it constitutes (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2010). In the UK, tackling this threat from extremism has led to a wave of counter-terrorism policies and anti-terrorism legislation. Indeed, the term has also resulted in a polarized debate about what the term extremism means amongst academics, policy makers and politicians. Critics argue that the term extremism is far too broad and being converged with problematic associations with words linked to violent acts, such as 'violent extremism'; 'fundamentalism'; 'radicalisation'; 'Islamism' and 'terrorism' (Davies 2008). Moreover, Eatwell (2006) argues that the term 'cumulative extremism' should be adopted to define extremist threats to UK national security. The British Government has defined extremism as a 'vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas' (HM Government 2011: 107).

The problem with such definitions is that they will shift over time and similarly the term extremism will also evolve and change, challenging how we conceptualise and respond to the phenomena. Indeed, Hillyard (1993) argued that Irish communities living in the UK in the 1960s were often labelled as extremists and therefore became a primary 'suspect' community at that time. In this case, that labelling was focused on the conflict in Northern Ireland and assumptions about who would likely be an extremist. However, that conceptualisation has shifted and changed over time. Furthermore, the above definitions can be considered as value-laden and subjective and as a result can be problematic when it comes to trying to understand the behaviour and patterns of individuals, groups, and movements described as extremist (Sunstein, 2009; Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, 2009).

Thus, this pervading debate as to who is and who is not an extremist is rooted in the political versus legal interpretation of extremism and terrorism. Despite the conceptual challenges involved in attempting to define the word extremism there is little doubt that some people labelled as extremists have had the capacity, and been able, to inflict harm and damage upon society in the pursuit of their ideological causes. Therefore, the problem for international governments is the need to balance civil liberties, whilst also preserving security (Bleich, 2010). Grayling (2009), for example, argues that the major problem for democracies across the world is the terrorist threat and how values and liberalisation are protected within communities.

As noted above, the label extremism for some groups and individuals can become a symbolic feature of their organisation, giving it credence and an opportunity to gather support and voice opposition or concerns (Chakraborti and Garland, 2009). Presently, the UK Government identifies the most serious threat emanating from international terrorism and focuses on Al-Qaeda led terrorism, followed by the domestic threat from terrorist groups in Northern Ireland and the threat from far-right extremist groups or lone individuals (HM Government, 2011).






However, the British government does recognise that similar extremist ideologies are also considered a threat to UK national security from the violent gang culture depicted in the London riots in 2011, animal rights extremism, anti-abortionists, and anti-capitalist extremism. There is no single pathway towards extremism, instead there are a wide range of reasons why someone would hold such views depending on their beliefs, vision, motivations, aims and values. These factors are based on several socio-economic, socio-demographic and cultural factors which are linked to issues of identity and self-critique (Davies, 2008).

In the UK the counter-terrorism strategy is called CONTEST and has four key themes in tackling the threat from terrorism. They are to; 'protect'; 'pursue'; 'prepare' and 'prevent' a terrorist attack. This strategy prefers to move away from the term 'violent terrorism' to just terrorism because it enables the inclusion of diverse acts and behaviours around terrorism to include 'glorifying, provocation or the promotion of criminal or terrorist inspired activity' (Crown Prosecution Service Website, 2010). The concern is that the word violent may shift the focus away from these broad range of harmful activities to only those that are overtly violent. However, as you will see below, in other countries and jurisdictions, there is a preference for 'violent extremism' as a core term.

However, the difficulties of definition and classification do not end there. For example, Choudhury (2007) argues that extremism and radicalisation often become merged into one uniformed principle. He states that; "*Radicalisation requires the communication of extremist ideas*" (Choudhury 2007: 22). However as noted above, extremism is a vague concept and one that has by implication the potential to marginalise and stigmatise a specific community (such as the Muslim community when discussing Islamist extremism). In defining extremism, the UK Prevent Strategy 2011, focused on challenging and understanding the causes of what makes someone follow an 'extremist' or a 'radical' way of life and begin a process of engagement and support for those who the government deem at risk of becoming extremists. Moreover, there is a need for wider social and political debate to further understand not just what the term extremism means, but also the increasingly important role technology and the Internet is playing as extremist groups begin to use it to recruit, indoctrinate and radicalise 'vulnerable' individuals.





Is there a ‘Modern’ Definition of Terrorism?

Another problem for understanding terrorism and its importance to HE contexts, is the lack of an agreed and shared definition in different countries and territories across the globe. For example, the United Nations has not yet accepted a definition of terrorism. Therefore, not having a universal definition of the word extremism has led to the media and politicians often portraying terrorists as those working from purported religious or ideological positions, at the same time, ignoring other extremism individuals and groups. For example, in the UK and many countries of Europe, terrorists are primarily represented as dangerous ‘Islamists’, which evokes images of ‘Muslim terrorists’ and ‘Muslim fundamentalists’. This ignores many areas of violence that should be considered, such as far-right extremism, far-left extremism and environmental activism, etc. There are debates currently around whether misogynist or male-supremacy movements, the Incel movement for instance, should be defined as extremism and terrorism, given the hate speech, methods and criminal incidents exhibited by some of those who affiliate with these ideas (Dodd, 2023).

According to Schmid (1983), there are over 109 different definitions of the word terrorism, and *‘the term has been used in so many different senses as to become almost meaningless’ (Laqueur 1987; 11). Difficulties arise around the fact that there are not universal definitions of the terms extremism and terrorism. Assumptions are often made that labelling individuals and groups just because of assumed religious, faith, or ideological views is acceptable. However, the misidentification and labelling of people and groups due to racism, discrimination, or misinformation, can lead to further resentment and anger amongst minority groups.*

Historically, there have been debates around use of the term ‘terrorism’ since its inception. For example, in a House of Lords (UK) debate surrounding terminology it was noted that there was a lack of clarity when it came to defining the word terrorism.


‘I can only agree with what was said by both the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, and the noble Lord, Lord Cope; namely, that there are great difficulties in finding a satisfactory definition. Indeed, I was unable to do so and I suspect that none of us will succeed. As I say, we must do our best but I hope we will not spend too much time on the definition’- (Cited in *A Report by Lord Carlile*, 2006: 4).

Due to these definitional problems, there have been calls to shift the focus away from who are the terrorists to how do people who might harm others in this way behave? It also challenges us to think beyond stereotypes and assumptions and to think about broader extremisms in our own societies and globally. For instance, Hadley (2009: 367) states,

“It is not an exaggeration to say that there are as many definitions of terrorism in the literature as there are terrorist attacks in the real world. All of the leading definitions of terrorism, moreover, it is widely acknowledged, have their strengths and weaknesses and are more or less vulnerable to objection by counter-example. This has prompted some recent commentators to eschew attempting to define terrorism; instead they try to show what is distinctive or characteristic about it.”

Definitions are important as they help different groups to discuss and examine issues using a common language. They can act as a starting point to enable wider debate and so forth. Therefore, having no international or global wide agreement on the term terrorism can be problematic for practice and response.





Within this landscape of uncertainty and lack of agreement over terms, countries try and create their own policy and terms. The UK definition of terrorism can be found under section 1 of the *Terrorism Act 2000* and cites it as the use of threat of action where:

- the action falls within subsection 2,
- the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, or ideological cause,

In terms of subsection 2, this relates to action that:

- Involves serious violence against a person,
- Involves serious damage to property,
- Endangers a person's life other than that of the person committing the action,
- Is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.

Whilst this definition might appear clear and unequivocal, as you examine it further it becomes apparent that there are many judgements to be made about terms such as 'serious damage', 'the purpose of advancing' and so forth. It is easy to see how any definition might be challenged because of differing interpretations of public policy.

Investigating and Thinking Activity: How Does your Country Define Terrorism?




As can be seen, there are diverse understandings of terrorism but there are also some key features that the policies of many countries across Europe do share. It is important to understand these in your own country, as this is most relevant to your practice within higher education or other sectors. Spend 15-20 minutes on your country's government main website or areas where it hosts information on extremism and terrorism and examine:

- a) Whether you can find any policy guidance or documentation about extremism and hate?
- b) How are risk/s of terrorism and extremism represented?
- c) Whether specific groups mentioned as 'typical' extremists or is there imagery representing terrorism/extremism and what do you notice about this?
- d) What is noticeable about specific information about any groups mentioned?
- e) Whether you think that discussion on the site covers the range of people who might, potentially, perpetrate extremist acts?

Comment: For some undertaking this task, they might find nothing around hate and extremism on governmental or other security agency webpages. Even today, for some countries extremism and hate does not even warrant a mention or the material might be very sparse. If you did find some guidance or policy material open to the public, do you think that this presents any indication of a 'typical' extremist and their features? Perhaps there are images alongside the material you found. Again, consider how these are deployed and what they imply about extremism. In most countries, extremism will be represented through the lens of dominant policy makers and cultural ideas. In some countries this will relate to historical relationships with other countries around or to specific political situations.





In others, the focus and terminology might rest upon religious or cultural differences of potential perpetrators. Very rarely, you will find a wide range of possible risks and threats outlined by policy documents. The main thing to remember is that policy documentation, along with media coverage, typically focuses on specific features of extremists, often in a narrow way. This can be risky because it gives a false sense of 'us' and 'them'. However, Europol (2020) state in their report entitled '*Terrorism in the EU: geographically widespread and multifaceted*', that one of the biggest risks in relation to terrorism is the lack of recognition of its diversity, reach and scope. Being able to think beyond the assumptions of policy and typical practice, is vital in ensuring HE, and wider societies, are safe from violent extremism.

As noted above there are many different interpretations of the word extremism and different groups regarded as extremists, depending on one's point of view, the time, and so forth. The UK government uses the Prevent Strategy 2011 to deal with extremism. A Home Affairs Select Committee report into examining the root causes of extremism has found that the UK government will be expanding its Prevent portfolio with more/new projects aimed at understanding how people become radicalised (Commons Select Committee, 2011). It does appear that pseudo-religious indoctrination of British Muslims can, in some cases, be rooted in an ideology that promotes hate, anger, alienation and ultimately lead to people committing acts of violence, extremism and terrorism (Fanshawe and Sriskandarajah, 2010). However, there are wider violent threats from other groups who claim they have diverse ideological justifications, as will be outlined below. Extremism has been defined as behaviour which might include 'glorifying, provocation or the promotion of criminal or terrorist inspired activity' (Crown Prosecution Service, 2010). The above interpretation though remains vague and at best lacks clarity, leading to a perception that government policy is being shaped on a subjective process which may in-effect marginalise the communities they deem to be extremists (Lambert, 2011). Davies (2008) argues that the term extremism should cover a wide range of forms and should not be simply viewed as Islamist extremism.


Changing Definitions and Debates – Violent Extremisms?

February the 12th globally is recognised as *International day for the Prevention of Violent Extremism*. However, you might be asking yourself how the term 'violent' has been added to definitions and what that means. UNESCO (2023) argue that <https://www.unesco.org/en/preventing-violent-extremism> is a threat to peace and tolerance and that countering it is not enough with prevention being vital. It can be understood to be forms of extremism that condone and use/promote violence with ideological or deliberate intent. For instance, this can be around political or religious beliefs or other ideas about the world that are deeply held. The perpetrators are prepared and advocate, the use of violence to promote and achieve their goals. This emphasised that people who perpetrate violent acts can use diverse justifications for why they do it based on a host of beliefs and ideologies.

The addition of the term 'violent' to extremism emphasises that some people might hold extremist views but not act upon them and harm others. Holding hate-filled or prejudicial beliefs in general, is not an offence. There are value-judgements and risks to individual rights involved when judging the views of others. Linked to this is the Right to Freedom of Speech, enshrined in much EU Human Rights Legislation and that in individual countries. In the UK, the Human Rights Act 1998 states:

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
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers ...”

However, when extremism is acted upon, there can be consequences and where those acts are violent, the damage and abuse to others can be catastrophic. Thus, the Human Rights Act 1998, goes onto add:

‘The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others ...’

In other words, in the UK, there are boundaries in terms of freedom of speech. One can hold views but where these are uttered, governmental authorities can make a judgement as to whether these spoken views might cause harm to others. Later in the toolkit we examine the issue of freedom of speech as it pertains to teaching and other activities in HEIs. For now, the focus of the toolkit is violent extremism and potential or actual actions of individuals or groups. The combining of the term ‘violent’ with extremism, focuses our attention specifically upon actions (rather than beliefs people may hold), which may be extremism and/or driven by ideological justifications.





Section 2: Violent Extremist Groups, Lists and Recognised Restricted or Proscribed Groups

Most countries in Europe, the European Commission, and agencies worldwide, have created lists of banned/restricted or proscribed groups who it is believed hold violent extremist views. In many jurisdictions it is illegal to be a member of such groups or to promote their ideas and views. These lists are always changing, with some groups added or removed, other groups disbanding or changing name (which usually leads to the new group being added to the list) and so forth. Keeping up with such changes can be difficult due to alterations.

Proscribed groups in the UK and Restricted Groups in the EU

The UK government has maintained an open access list of proscribed groups that can be accessed by the general public since 2013 and this was last amended in 2021. It lists the extremist groups or organisations banned under UK law, and, for transparency, provides the criteria that are considered when deciding whether to proscribe a group or organisation. It can be found at:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-organisations--2>

Under the Terrorism Act 2000, the UK Home Secretary can proscribe an organisation if they believe it is concerned in terrorism, and it is proportionate to do. For the purposes of the Act, this means that the organisation:

- commits or participates in acts of terrorism
- prepares for terrorism
- promotes or encourages terrorism (including the unlawful glorification of terrorism)
- is otherwise concerned in terrorism

Proscription makes it a criminal offence for an individual to: belong to or invite support for a proscribed organisation; arrange a meeting in support of a proscribed organisation and wear clothing or carry articles in public which arouse reasonable suspicion, that an individual is a member or supporter of the proscribed organisation. The penalties for proscription offences are high, with a maximum of 10 years in prison and/or a fine.

In Europe, different countries have their own proscribed lists (often using other terms but encapsulating the same idea of proscription). The EU offers a 'Terrorist list' under its Consilium pages. These can be found at:


<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/terrorist-list/>

This site offers criterial, restrictive measures, sanctions and procedures for listing and delisting groups as extremist.

It is important that HEI staff are aware of such lists as groups included on these are prohibited. These are banned groups, in effect, and therefore would be easier to identify, for instance, as not acceptable to be active on campus. It is far more difficult than this though because many forms of extremism are


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not on any such lists and require identification and judgement for HEI staff regarding reporting issues and so forth.





Section 3: Extremism Group Activities in the Partner Countries


In this section we examine some examples of extremism group activity in the CHECK IT HE partner countries, to provide case studies of the kinds of groups operating across Europe and give some insight into their activities.

Cyprus

The National Popular Front (ELAM) is a far-right political party in the Republic of Cyprus that has been linked to violent extremism. It was founded in 2008 and was approved as a political party in May 2011. The party promotes Greek nationalism and adopts an antisemitic, anti-Turkish Cypriot, racist and xenophobic agenda while it has been openly connected with the criminal organisation Golden Dawn (ex far-right political party in Greece). ELAM's ideology is based on the idea of a pure Greek-Cypriot state and the preservation of Greek-Cypriot culture and identity. The party is strongly opposed to any perceived threats to these values, including immigration, multiculturalism, and Turkish-Cypriots' presence in the Republic of Cyprus. ELAM's activities have been the subject of controversy and criticism from human rights groups and politicians in Cyprus. The party has been accused of using hate speech and inciting violence against migrants and refugees. In addition, the party's anti-Turkish rhetoric has been seen as a barrier to reconciliation between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities in Cyprus. ELAM has been linked to several incidents of violent extremism. These incidents concerned attacks against Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriot students in 2015, attacks against Turkish Cypriot taxi drivers in 2016, the arson attack against a mosque in the same year, malicious damage caused to Turkish Cypriots' cars at Troodos Mountain in 2017, attacks by helmet-wearing fascists during a bi-communal event during the same year as well as repeated attacks by a right-wing affiliated football club against Turkish Cypriots. Another incident that took place in 2015, involved a group of young people representing the far-right organization ELAM and a 25-year-old Nigerian student. The student was beaten by the youth in a main street in Nicosia. The case was categorised as undetected by the police as not enough evidence was gathered to proceed with prosecution. These incidents indicate that the presence of ELAM offers a platform for normalising ultra-nationalism and its underpinning elements such as racism, hate speech and hate crime, violence and reinforcing the exclusion of communities such as Turkish Cypriots and, by extension, all Muslims (Research Institute Prometheus, 2015; HIT, 2019; KISA, 2019). Undeniably, ELAM's activities promote division and hostility towards minority communities, which goes against the principles of democracy and human rights. To counter their influence, it is important for the Cyprus government and civil society groups to work together in promoting tolerance and inclusivity.

In 2010, the Cypriot parliament passed the Combating Terrorism Act (No. 110(I)/2010) to counteract terrorism and terrorist financing, which had become an increasingly significant global threat. The Act was necessary to align Cyprus with the anti-terrorism policies of the European Union (EU). The Act defines terrorism as any act that severely harms people or property for political, ideological, or religious purposes. It also criminalizes terrorist acts,





including the use of explosives or other dangerous substances, attacks on public or private property, and hostage-taking. Anyone convicted of terrorism-related offenses may face severe penalties, including imprisonment and fines. The government can freeze the assets of individuals or organizations suspected of supporting terrorist activities to prevent them from financing terrorist acts. The Act also provides for international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, including the sharing of information and the extradition of suspected terrorists. In addition, the Act includes preventive measures such as the regulation of travel documents and the monitoring of suspicious financial transactions. The Combating Terrorism Act of 2010 is an essential legal framework in Cyprus for preventing and punishing terrorist activities, demonstrating the country's commitment to combating terrorism globally and aligning with EU policies on terrorism (COE, 2011).


The Grey Wolves is a fascist, Turkish nationalist, and pan-Turkic organization and movement which rose to prominence in the late 1970s. As a political movement, it is referred to as the Idealist Movement (Ülkücü Hareket) and is responsible for many acts of violence, including the 1981 attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II. The Grey Wolves is the militant wing of the Turkish nationalist organization, Idealist Hearths, and responsible for many acts of violence. Their ideology lies in the idea of a Greater Turkey that includes all Turkic peoples, and they are strongly opposed to any perceived threats to Turkish identity and interests.

This violent extremist group has a significant presence in the Turkish-occupied side of Cyprus. Known for its extreme Turkish nationalist ideology and the group has been involved in numerous acts of violence against Turkish Cypriots who are perceived to be pro-Greek or pro-Western. For example, in 2015, when two Turkish Cypriots - Çinel Senem and Koray Chief Correctional - were tried in a "court" in the occupied city of Famagusta for waving the flag of their country, the Republic of Cyprus, at their workplace, Grey Wolves attacked the pair in front of the courthouse and shouted slogans for their death and destruction.

The presence of Grey Wolves in Cyprus has raised concerns among some Cypriots and human rights activists. The group's violent actions are seen as a threat to the stability and security of the island. In addition, the group's extreme Turkish nationalist ideology is seen as a barrier to a peaceful resolution of the Cyprus issue. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has condemned the Grey Wolves' violent actions and has called for their activities to be curbed. However, some critics argue that the Turkish government has been complicit in the group's activities. The MHP, the Grey Wolves' parent organization, is a key ally of the ruling AKP party in Turkey, and some analysts argue that the AKP has turned a blind eye to the group's activities in Cyprus and elsewhere.

The US Congress passed an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act that requires the State Department to send a report on the activities of the Grey Wolves and assess if it meets the criteria for being designated as a foreign terrorist organization. France has already banned the group for inciting discrimination and hatred, and members of the European Parliament have proposed to include the group on the EU terrorist list. The German parliament also adopted a motion to outlaw the group's affiliates, prevent its online agitation, and monitor its activities (CEP, 2023).





Finland

According to Ministry of the Interior in Finland (2020) there have been reports of violent extremist movements engaging in activities throughout Finland. Besides violent far-right non-parliamentary movements, also few activists on the far left, primarily anarchists and anti-fascists, are reported to be active. Nevertheless, the violent non-parliamentary extreme left's actions have become less frequent in Finland during the past few years.

The terrorist groups continue to be a threat and might have an impact on radicalization and mobilization in Finland. However, the threat of terrorism in Finland remains at the second level, or "elevated," on the four-tier scale used by the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service.

Preventive measures are needed in this work. The Ministry of the Interior routinely releases reports on the state of violent extremism that detail all active violent extremist organizations. These organizations include the violent extremes of the non-parliamentary right and left, violent extremism fueled by religion, radical alternative movements, and individuals.

Individuals can use radical ideas or ideologies to justify their violent behavior. According to Ministry they pose a threat as the potential for street violence against perceived opponents who might be chosen at random as victims. School shootings can be mentioned as an example of this kind of behavior. Radical ideas are often linked with mental health disorders and attacks carried out by individuals are often considered as acts of lone wolves. One of the shootings occurred in Seinäjoki University of Applied Sciences in 2008 when a 22-year-old student shoot eleven of his fellow students and injured eleven (YLE 2008). Another example of violent act in HE campus was revealed by police in 2014. A young man was planning a gas and gunfire attack in Helsinki University campus in order to harm as many people as possible but it was prevented and the man was prosecuted. (YLE 2019.)


According to report of Poliisiammattikorkeakoulu (Finnish Police Academy, 2023) there are almost a hundred organisations of professional crime in Finland and the number has increased during recent years. Most of them are motorcycle gangs and groups that operate in drug industry and trade. In crime prevention it is important to recognize the diversity of groups in grass-root level and utilize the information networks. Criminal groups often try to recruit vulnerable young people who feel that they are not accepted in Finland because of their ethnical background and offer them a way to succeed in life. To prevent these criminal organizations gaining ground, it is acknowledged that it is important to correct the false impression of professional crime that social media content is giving (Jukarainen et. al. 2023.)

Extremist groups in Finland

Radical Islamist movements exist in Finland, most significantly the radical Islamist terrorism according to the Ministry of the Interior. There are considerable activities supporting terrorism occurring in Finland, and there are people and organisations who have the motivation and capacity to carry out such operations.

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Also hate speech is rising as radicalization and violent extremism are flourishing. The goal of hate campaigns and online shaming is to affect society more broadly. Specifically weak people or groups are in vulnerable position.

Growing anti-Semitism is on the topic. Anti-Semitic discourse, propaganda, and the threat of violence are some the main ways that it is expressed in Finland. The Nordic Resistance Movement (Pohjoismainen vastarintaliike) is one to be mentioned in relation to anti-Semitic attacks. The Nordic Resistance Movement was founded in 1997 in Sweden and banned in Finland in 2019. (Korkein oikeus, 2020). It could be described as pan-nordic neo-nazi movement.

There are also other far-right movements of which ideology is mixture of neo-Nazism, Christian nationalism and white supremacy. For instance, the Blue-and –Black Movement is a neo-nazist party which was founded in 2021.

Soldiers of Odin is an anti-immigrant anti-Islam group which was founded in Kemi, Finland, in October of 2015. The group was established in response to the thousands of migrants who were arriving in Finland amidst the European migrant crisis and the message was to keep the real Finns safe. The group members describe themselves as Finnish affiliation of street patrol organization which has its roots in The US and European countries (Soldiers of Odin 2023.)

Far-right groups might be quite small in Finland but their influence on politics is recognisable. During Covid -19 the groups spread Qanon conspiracy theories and gained a small amount of supporters. Parliamentary populist parties have adapted many of their ideas and they clearly oppose immigration and multiculturalism. Some of the populist party members have been known for racist writings in social media.


Serbia

Regarding violent extremism, radicalisation and terrorism in Serbia in general, one cannot avoid placing emphasis on right-winged extremists. The extreme right is a mix of different, often contradictory ideologies, which makes it difficult to clearly define it. On the one hand, the extreme right in modern society accepts some of the traditional values of historical fascism and Nazism, while on the other it advocates (quasi) democracy, justifying its activities by "defending democracy" or "vulnerable groups".

The common ideological denominator of most of these extremists and their organisations in Serbia is as follows: advocating the unification of all „Serbian countries“ by changing the existing regional borders, glorification of war criminals who committed war crimes during the 1990s, historical revisionism and the rehabilitation of collaborators of the Nazi regime, opposition to European integration, building an identity based on belonging to the Serbian Orthodox Church and hatred towards minority communities.

Right-wing organisations often present themselves as protectors of citizens and use violence to achieve their goals. For instance, members of the organisation Leviathan, who supposedly advocate the





protection of animals, invade Roma settlements and abuse their inhabitants because the latter supposedly abuse animals. They record their actions and publish them on the Internet whereby the primary goal is to humiliate, scorn and deride the Roma population.

In addition to the previously mentioned example, at one point in Serbia, there were more than twenty extremist right-winged organisations. Two of them have been banned: National Guard (Nacionalni stroj, 2011), and the Homeland Movement HONOUR (Otačastveni pokret Obraz, 2012).

The National Guard was a neo-Nazi organisation of members who defined themselves as „an alliance of racially conscious nationalists“. The reason why this organisation was banned in 2011 was an incident during which members of this organisation attacked citizens who participated in an anti-fascist walk "Stop Fascism!" held on October 7, 2007. The members of the National Guard attacked citizens, and several participants of the walk were hit with stones and severely hurt. The leader of the National Guard, Goran Davidović (nicknamed Führer) was formally accused of this incident. However, the court proceedings ended in 2019 with the acquittal of Davidović. After the acquittal, Davidović decided to become politically active and even participated in the 2020 elections.

The Homeland Movement HONOUR (OBRAZ) was a typical clerofascist organisation. This organisation's actions were primarily directed against anti-fascist movements and the members of the LGBTQ+ population. In 2010 the members of this organisation rampaged through the streets of the Serbian capital, breaking shop windows and clashing with the police. However, in 2016. Mladen Obradović, the leader of this organisation, and all his associates were legally acquitted and he continued to advocate his extreme views.

Unfortunately, according to some relevant experts on this topic, in the future one can only expect further increased actions of the extreme right, the renewal and strengthening of pro-fascist and neo-Nazi groups, the creation of new far-right organisations, the absence of appropriate reaction of the judiciary to violent actions, causing and inciting racial, national, religious hatred and intolerance; favourable (or openly supportive) attitude of the highest government representatives towards the extreme right; connection of certain extremist organizations and groups with clerical ones circles and parts of the Serbian Orthodox Church; strengthening of the extreme right in the environment, primarily in Europe, etc.

What can be done?


Educating the young in regards to methods and approaches of how to respond to extreme right-wing activism;

Creating and making available the content (video clips, short films, brochures, etc.) that unmask and deconstruct extremism, its ideas and actions;

Anti-fascist organisations and groups should be given space in various CSO programs, and alternative and free activities in schools, in order to reaffirm the ideas and values of anti-fascism;

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Organising legal assistance and other types of support within anti-fascist organisations and coalitions for activists (and all others) who are targeted by extremists and their organisations;

The media should be approached proactively and with a new communication style strategy.

Turkey

Far-left and far-right ideologies, Kurdish separatism and nationalism, and Islamism are all connected to internal extremist movements in Turkey. In Turkey, radicalisation means “a process in which individuals or organisations adopt more extreme political or religious ideas and goals, and legitimise extreme methods, adopt strategies, or threaten for their realisation” (Köse, n.d.). Although it might contain cognitive and behavioural or non-violent and violent aspects (Ünal & Ünal, 2018, p. 328), we focus more on violent behavioural aspects. According to the Turkish Anti – Terrorism Law (12.04.1991), “Terrorism means any action committed by one or more members of an organization using force and violence, intimidation, coercion, or threat methods with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic, disrupting the political, legal, social, secular, or economic order of the state, compromising the unity of the Turkish state and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, impairing or destroying the authority of the state or taking over it, annihilating fundamental rights and freedoms, or disrupting the internal and external security, public order, or general health of the state”.

Far-left and far-right ideologies


In Turkey, far-right and far-left extremist organisations first appeared in the late 1960s. What started as widespread protests against Turkey's NATO membership and the propagation of socialism on college campuses quickly evolved into Marxist guerilla warfare. Beginning in the early 1970s, student-led organisations carried out a number of terrorist acts, some of which were directed at American servicemen, because they thought that the United States controlled Turkey's culture, economy, and military. These organisations thought using violence would help Turkey achieve socialism and “drive off” American influence. Many early extremist leaders were subsequently given the death penalty or were slain by security forces in conflict, leading to the organisations' demise.

Grey Wolves

The Grey Wolves are a pan-Turkish, ultra-nationalist organisation that gained notoriety in Turkey in the late 1970s. Although the group, known as the *Ülkü Ocakları* (Idealist Hearths) in Turkish, is a youth movement operating as a nationalist political and cultural organizations (thus, whether they are an extremist group is debated in Turkey), their extremist ideology has incited members to commit violent crimes, which allows us to define them as an extremist group (Sayari, 2010, p. 203).

The Grey Wolves have a sizable presence in Turkey and the diaspora, particularly in Western Europe, where they have a wide reach. Members of the Grey Wolves have engaged in political violence, taken part in armed conflict, and built a network of organisations to engage with youth and communities.





There have been various groups affiliated with this ideology, e.g., Ülkü Ocakları, which have been effective on campuses for the recruitment of members and spread of their ideology. The 1970s were particularly violent due to clashes between leftist and far right-wing groups (Acar, 2018, p. 153). The “communist threat” played a major role in their actions; although the activities of the groups “cooled down” after the 1990s, the organisations still exist and attract university students (especially male students). The members of these youth organisations either come from families with a rural background or middle-class urban families (Acar, 2018, p. 156).

The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), a member of Turkey's current (as of May 2023) governing coalition, was created by Turkish politician Alparslan Türkeş three years prior to the formation of the Wolves. The Wolves served as the MHP's armed wing in the 1970s, conducting assaults and murders on leftists, journalists, and dissidents. Members of Grey Wolves believe that Devlet Bahçeli, the MHP's current chairman, is the group's leader because the group is still connected to that political party (Counter Extremism Project [CEP] Turkey: Extremism and Terrorism, n.d.).

Kurdish separatism or nationalism


Special consideration must be given to the past and present of Turkey's Kurdish crisis while studying the history of extremism and terrorism there. Although there have been various Kurdish extremist movements in Turkey, the most prominent and long-lasting has been the PKK. A second would be Hezbollah; despite its Kurdish roots, we believe Hezbollah needs to be handled under religious extremist groups.

The Turkish government views the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karekeren Kurdistan, or PKK) as the biggest and most powerful terror organisation operating within its borders. The PKK encourages violence to establish an independent Kurdish state in the autonomous territories of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. It was founded in 1978 by Öcalan and his friends, but there have also been other Kurdish radical movements in the 70s and 80s (e.g. DDKO, T-DKP). The PKK had close contact with the THKP-C, a radical leftist movement supporting revolutionary struggle and combat. The radicalisation of PKK in the 1980s was mainly due to the coup in 1980. Following this, it has battled for the creation of a Kurdish state and has carried out terror attacks against military, governmental, and civilian targets. The targets of PKK were feudal elites in the region, members of political parties, and security forces of the state (for detailed information, see Ercan, 2010, p. 194–203).

The PKK has Marxist-Leninist roots (Ercan, 2010, p. 191). Abdullah Öcalan, the organisation's leader, was imprisoned in 1999. Following this, he ceased calling for the creation of a separate, independent Kurdish state and called for further autonomy within Turkey (“Öcalan'ın söylemi”, 2004). Although there were attempts to solve the Kurdish problem with the democratisation process in the mid-2000s, politics could not sufficiently address the problems, and the past few years have been very turbulent regarding relations with the state. Öcalan even called for armed action in 2004 (Tezür, 2010, p. 780).

Islamist Extremism





ISIS is an extremist organisation that sprang from the Iraqi and Syrian al-Qaeda splinter groups and has subsequently started to create satellite operations in nine other nations (CEP, Turkey: Extremism and Terrorism, n.d.). ISIS has also become increasingly active in Turkey. ISIS and other Islamic terror organisations have gathered strength along Turkey's borders with Syria and Iraq. Additionally, a sizable number of foreign fighters have entered Turkey in an effort to join these organisations. The terror group is suspected of being behind several significant domestic terrorist attacks, to name some:

- such suicide bombings in public areas occurred;
 - 2015, at a peace rally in Ankara, 201 people killed and more than 500 injured,
 - 2016, Sultanahmet (main touristic attraction area) bombing,
 - 2016, Atatürk Airport in Istanbul,
 - 2016 at a Kurdish wedding in Gaziantep,
 - 2017 a nightclub shooting in Istanbul, 39 killed
- (CEP, Turkey: Extremism and Terrorism, n.d.)


In addition to carrying out a number of terrorist operations inside Turkey, ISIS has also utilised it as a base to enlist and facilitate the recruitment of foreign militants. Kurdish youth have been enlisted by an ISIS cell in southern Turkey known as Dokumacılar to fight for the terrorist organisation in Syria and carry out strikes in Turkey. Between 2,000 and 2,200 Turkish combatants left Türkiye by 2015 to fight alongside extremist organisations.

Hezbollah: It is also known as Kurdish Hezbollah (KH). It is a violent Kurdish Sunni Muslim organisation that operates in southeast Turkey. Its leaders, who apparently were trained in Iran before the organisation was founded in 1978 (with an agenda to overthrow the Turkish secular state; Ünal & Ünal, 2018, p. 336), were greatly affected by the Iranian revolution. In southeast Turkey, both Hezbollah and the PKK have engaged in brutal combat. In an effort to establish an independent Islamic state in southeast Turkey, KH has been at war with the PKK and Turkish security forces. Although it has been a violent movement since its beginning, the first half of the 90s were particularly violent (Övet et al., 2021, p. 4). Following these violent moves, the Turkish state started to make serious moves against the organisation (Ünal & Ünal, 2018, pp. 339-340). Following an extensive operation in 2000, the public became aware of the extent of their violent actions. Thus, the bodies of 67 kidnapped and murdered individuals were found. The organisation is also known for violent moves, like arson, kidnapping, murder, bombings and the assassination of a police chief in Diyarbakır. Today, it is active as a political party under the name Hûda-Par (founded in 2013) with a radical Islamist agenda.

A final remark/conclusion

We believe that a few points need to be highlighted regarding the recruitment policies of extremist groups. It is interesting that the main regions for recruitment for Kurdish movements, such as the PKK and Hezbollah, but also for religious movements like ISIS are from overlapping areas and demographic backgrounds. ISIS, for instance, is suspected or attempted to recruit 53.000 from cities in the south-eastern cities of Turkey by June 2017 (Övet et al., 2021, p. 4). Some of these organisations have adopted





institutional ways of recruitment (especially with junior university students), along with kinship through families or peers (Ünal & Ünal, 2018, p. 345).

With such radical movements, one needs to look into the push and pull factors; some of these are (Övet et al., 2021, pp.5-6):

- exclusionary policies and state repression, repression of participation
- poor human rights implementations
- transborder ethnic kin
- "socially based significance loss"

When looked at the particular conditions in Türkiye, particularly in the south-east of the country, the following aspects seem significant (Övet et al., 2021, pp. 8–16):

- being born into a culture of resistance
- military abuse
- hard secular reforms (especially for religious movements)
- economic and demographic factors (relatively lower income and employment, large families)
- vulnerable groups targeted
- displacement and migration
- geographical factors (borderlines, mountainous areas providing shelter for extremist groups)

1. How to combat terrorism and extremism? Any apps developed?

Turkey's Efforts to Fight Terrorism


Turkey has put a lot of effort into developing procedures for more effective counterterrorism measures on a bilateral level as well as at numerous international forums, as follows (as listed in the MFA, n.d.):

- Turkey's involvement with NATO, and the UN system's efforts and all UN counterterrorism tools by carrying out the decisions of the UN Security Council,
- Through the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), founded by Turkey and the US,
- By being an active participant in the Anti-Da'esh Coalition,
- Also, through Operation Euphrates Shield, which dramatically lessened Da'esh presence in Iraq and Syria,
- Through bilateral agreements within the scope of counterterrorism with more than 70 nations worldwide,
- Through training with diverse nations in the fight against terrorism,
- Through public awareness and prevention campaigns

Further ways to combat terrorist and extremist actions:

- Legislation (Anti-terror law, <https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuatmetin/1.5.3713.pdf>) and Counter-terrorism Department within the Security General Directorate





- Through organizing and carry out military operations
- In its fight against terrorism, Turkey has also developed artificial intelligence applications, software and models as one of the new and indispensable areas of the current era within the scope of increasing the military capabilities of the country. There are apps to fight terrorism; however, these are not available to the public.
- Risk management and profiling methods are used to create a social awareness against members of those organizations.

United Kingdom

According to security agencies, the UK is believed to have a number of violent extremist threats from diverse groups representing a host of interests, values and agendas. Dodds (2022) notes that official figures are concerning. Analysis of the current situation shows that the United Kingdom primarily faces a dual threat of violent extremism, primarily (but not only) from extreme Islamists, such as adherents of Islamic State, and from the extremist far right, trying to trigger a race war to further their ideology. Dodds (2022: online) writes:

“Since March 2017, counter-terrorism police and the intelligence services have stopped 32 plots they assess as aiming to cause mass casualties on British soil. Of these they assess 18 were Islamist related, and 12 were triggered by extreme rightwing terrorist ideology. The other two were linked to category known as left, anarchist or single-issue terrorism (LASIT).”


Threats are evolving and always in development, which is why counter terrorism approaches in the UK, likewise, are always under review. As noted above, there are proscribed and banned groups that are tracked but in addition, intelligence is being gathered to assess risk and threat level in relation to other groups. That intelligence might come from the activities of the security services, military, and police, but also from institutions/organisations and members of the general public.

One example of an extremist group that has operated in the UK is the group known as "National Action." National Action was a far-right, neo-Nazi organization that emerged in 2013 and was banned by the UK government in December 2016, after its ideology and activities were deemed to be promoting terrorism. The group's activities involved promoting white supremacy, racism, and anti-Semitism through public demonstrations, online propaganda, and recruitment efforts. They aimed to incite hatred, division, and violence within society.

Another group, which demonstrates the way that extremist groups and ideologies operate across national boundaries, influencing incidents individual states but remaining difficult to pin down to one country is the Feuerkrieg Division (FKD), which was proscribed in the UK in July 2020. FKD is a white supremacist group founded in late 2018 that has an international reach and scope of action and a membership across North America and Europe. The group honours the promotion of violence and mass murder in pursuit of a race war. Materials produced and promoted by the group have been cited to be

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
abusive, racist and antisemitic, demanding the deaths of many prominent individuals. FKD's members have been arrested on terrorism charges both in the UK and overseas. In September 2019, UK police apprehended a 16-year-old on suspicion of the commission, preparation, and instigation of acts of terrorism. The group response was to circulate a list of police buildings and offensive images of senior police officers. An image of the Chief Constable of West Midlands Police, with a gun to his head and the words "Race Traitor" across his eyes, urging members to carry out attacks in retaliation for the arrest of one of its followers

On 8 February 2020 FKD announced on its Telegram channel that it would be dissolving. The general view is that FKD are not disbanded are likely to still be active but members are continuing to act through other routes.

To counter the activities of National Action, the FKD and similar extremist groups, the UK government has, across the years, implemented a range of measures. These included legal action to ban the organisations, prosecution of its members, and disruption their activities. Law enforcement agencies, including the police and intelligence services, conducted investigations, monitor the online presence of such groups, and collaborate with international partners to gather intelligence.

Additionally, efforts are being made to prevent radicalization and promote community cohesion (some of which are discussed further below). Initiatives such as educational programmes, community engagement, and awareness campaigns are implemented to counter extremist narratives and provide support to vulnerable individuals who might be susceptible to radicalization. Radicalisation as a concept and process, is examined in sections of this educational resource below.





Section 4: Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in European Universities

University campuses in Europe and globally, have historically been thought of as open-minded spaces within which diverse ideas can be shared, contested, and debated. In recent years, we have seen an increase in politically driven mobilisations on higher educational campuses around debates in the public interest, and this can at times take forms like peaceful protests which embody a strong sense of political conviction. As the main institutions for the advancement of ideas, university campuses are faced with a unique problem (and responsibility) in terms of identifying clear lines between healthy public debate and the infiltration of ideological influences which can lead individuals towards radicalisation, or even violent extremism. European countries have adopted varying ways of addressing these challenges, and whilst each country has its own domestic policies, these can broadly be understood as approaches to Preventing or Countering Violent Extremism, commonly known as P/CVE.

Important questions for HEIs to consider in relation to extremism and violent extremisms are:

- *What kinds of extremism are a concern?*
- *How might individuals be drawn into extremism?*
- *What are the requirements around intervening and what are the legal frameworks?*

What do approaches to Violent Extremism and HEIs Look like in the UK?


Whilst Brexit has seen Britain leave the European Union, the Preventing Violent Extremism Strategy, which was developed in 2003 in the wake of 9/11 and was updated later in 2006 following the 2005 London bombings, is still in place. Whilst there have been some changes over time, very little has changed to Prevent since Britain left the EU, with the most recent update coming in 2015 which made it mandatory for all public facing institutions to prevent individuals from being drawn into violent extremism. Under Prevent, extremism is defined as:

Vocal or active opposition to the fundamental British values of democracy the rule of law individual liberty mutual respect tolerance of people with different faiths and beliefs (CONTEST, 2018).

Given it is a statutory duty for all public institutions to prevent individuals from being drawn into violent extremism, organisations are required by law to have Prevent training programmes for employees which focus on 'risk factors', and indicators that someone is being drawn into extremism (please see below under 'radicalisation' for an example of this). Where there is a cause for concern, individuals can be referred through the 'Channel' system, which is intended as a preventative intervention. Universities are bound by the statutory duty, and whilst there is no formal uniform criteria or list of 'risk factors', there is some consistency in the kinds of things that are often considered as indicators of someone being drawn into violent extremism:

- *General changes of mood, patterns of behaviour, secrecy,*
- *Changes of friends and mode of dress,*
- *Use of inappropriate language,*





- *Possession of violent extremist literature,*
- *The expression of extremist views,*
- *Planning to take long term holidays and visits out of the UK,*
- *Advocating violent actions and means,*
- *Association with known extremists,*
- *Seeking to recruit others to an extremist ideology (NST, 2022).*


Professionals working in HE settings in the UK are often expected to act on their own judgement based on the training and guidance provided. This can lead to problems, where people are referred to authorities in relation to extremism on questionable grounds, or where they have demonstrated some of the more ambiguous 'risk factors' listed above (e.g., changes of friends or mode of dress; changes in behaviour or increased secrecy; taking extended holidays outside of the UK), with no evidence that their behaviour is connected to extremism. In fact, nine out of ten Prevent referrals in 2017/18 did not require any de-radicalisation action (Liberty, 2019). It is also important to acknowledge that holding radical or extreme views in and of itself is not illegal, but inciting violence in the name of such beliefs is an offence (NST, 2022).

Across Europe more widely approaches to countering violent extremism vary, and there are International, European, and national levels of legislation which are relevant for CVE that overlap and inform approaches in universities. For example, the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) has developed both *A Teacher's Guide on the Prevention of Violent Extremism* (2016) and *Preventing Violent Extremism: a guide for policy makers* (2017). At the European level, the Council of Europe has produced a training pack for teachers on *Living with Controversy: Teaching Controversial Issues through Education for Democracy Citizenship and Human Rights* (2015) which includes issues of extremism (Davies 2018). Alongside this sits the wider Counter Terrorism Monitoring Reporting and Support Mechanism (CT MORSE), which is a European Union (EU) funded initiative providing coordination, monitoring and knowledge, as well as technical and implementation support interventions in the areas of counter-terrorism (CT) and preventing and countering violent extremism (CT Morse, 2023). In addition to the above, the Club de Madrid has organized widescale conferences for policy makers which have led to the development several outputs (Davies, 2018).

Radicalisation

This section examines further the idea raised above that it is possible to detect and prevent individuals being drawn into violent extremism and the concept of radicalisation. The European Commission has developed several initiatives including the European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism in 2014, which aimed to identify and counter the methods, propaganda and conditions through which people are drawn into extremism (Davies 2018). The concept of radicalisation is important to consider in relation to university and student life. Some groups and individuals are often taken to be more vulnerable to being 'radicalised' but how is such a process defined? The European Parliament (2021) state that radicalisation, is "*the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas, which could lead to acts of terrorism ... ideology is an intrinsic part of the radicalisation process*". The processes by which radicalisation can take place include being influenced by individuals, groups, and organisations, face-to-face, or commonly, through online means. It is the ideological element that the European Parliament are keen to highlight. Religious extremism might be assumed to be core to radicalisation and, whilst it is included, it is wrong to ignore the myriad





forms of ideology that can be used in radicalisation processes and lead to violent extremism, including far right and far left ideologies, Incel culture and other hatreds. The European Parliament (2021) have identified that social media, as well as online and mobile technologies - such as private messaging systems - have made the task of identifying when radicalisation is taking place problematic. However, they do recognise that educational institutions and HEIs are physical and online sites where radicalisation can occur.

If you consider the definition of radicalisation, anybody could be subject to this process, but there is a consensus that being more impressionable makes children and young people potentially more vulnerable. Attempts to identify those most vulnerable can end up becoming lists that are highly subjective and difficult to identify in practice. Some would even say such lists do not serve to help or support either potential targets of radicalisation, or those practitioners and others seeking to use them. Below is an example of such a list from the Brighton and Hove Children's Safeguarding partnership, UK, where they state:

"Children and young people at risk of radicalisation may:

- *Have low self-esteem*
- *Be confused about their faith, sense of belonging, or identity*
- *Be victims of bullying or discrimination*
- *Feel isolated or lonely*
- *Be experiencing stress or depression*
- *Be going through a transitional period in their life*
- *Be angry at other people or the government*
- *Feel angry about how they are treated or seen by society*

It is very difficult to know at what stage certain views can become dangerous, or if a child or young person is being exploited and manipulated into becoming a part of an extremist group."


As with the NST (2021) list of indicators given above for being drawn into extremism Brighton and Hove Safeguarding Children Partnership also try to encapsulate indicators that a child/young person is being radicalised, stating,

"Signs aren't always obvious, but indicators that a child or young person is being radicalised may include:

- *Withdrawal from family and friends, or changing circle of friends*
- *Hostility towards others*
- *Talking as if from a script*
- *Being unwilling to discuss their views*
- *Increased levels of anger*
- *Being secretive, particularly around what they are doing on the internet*
- *Using extremist terms to exclude people or incite violence*
- *Expressing the values of extremist or terrorist organisations (including political or religious based grievances)*

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- Supporting violence and terrorism towards other cultures, nationalities, or religions
- Writing or creating artwork that promotes extremist values
- Talking about being a ‘martyr’
- Possession of extremist literature or other material, or trying to access extremist websites
- Possession of any material about weapons, explosives, or military training

These signs don’t necessarily mean that a child is being radicalised. Sometimes this can be normal teenage behaviour, or an indicator that something else is going on.”


It is the last sentences of the lists that capture the problem in attempting to list signs of radicalisation – the issue lies in the fact that most of the listed possible indicators are ones that might be visible in any young people generally. These lists are very similar to those created in relation to indicators for abuse of children and young people, which sometimes have served to prevent identification of abuse because they encourage a ‘tick box’ simple approach to something of great complexity. Indeed, in ‘looking for’ certain signs, other important factors might be overlooked. Therefore, the authors of this toolkit want to emphasise scepticism in the value of such lists and encourage readers to use their relational experience with individual students and groups to enable them to consider if there are issues that need addressing. Whilst we do not feel that listing indicators helps, it is important that anything that raises concerns be taken to other colleagues or other appropriate people within your institution for consideration.

Thinking Point – Is Radicalisation About Contact with Groups and if so ?

Spend 5 minutes thinking about how you understand radicalisation, focusing on the question how are people radicalised – by what methods and in what contexts? Can someone be radicalised *without* meeting up with others face-to-face or even personally online?

Comment: We tend to think about radicalisation as a process involving face-to-face contact or even personal contact online. However, some recent cases have show that this is not always the case. People can be radicalised through reading materials, watching videos, even programmes they see on mainstream TV, and often it is the reception of the person to that information and how they see themselves and their identities that can impact on whether they are influenced. Dodds (2022) draws attention to the example of Darren Osborne, who drove a van into worshippers outside Finsbury Park Mosque in north London in 2017, killing one person. When investigating Osborne, the police and MI5 decided that he had radicalised himself, the process apparently taking only a month. This process began with mainstream material, as notes Osborne had written, showed he had been highly influenced by a BBC drama about child sex abuse exploitation involving Muslim males. From this Osborne listed to other online extremist material that referenced the BBC drama and then he went onto watch material from the English Defence League and Britain First. In Osborne’s case it was decided that he had radicalised himself, using the BBC drama and then materials he sought online to underpin his belief, which emboldened him to murder others. In Osborne and many other cases radicalisation can arise in groups but also as a lone individual, being influenced by materials and ideologies available on the web, in books, pamphlets and so forth.





EU Prevention of Radicalisation Policy

The European Commission has a wider Counter Terrorism and Radicalisation agenda, within which sits under their *Prevention of Radicalisation* Policy. The strategy encompasses a host of broad policy instruments, which include:

- ❖ Countering terrorist propaganda and illegal hate speech online: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/counter-terrorism-and-radicalisation/prevention-radicalisation/terrorist-content-online_en
- ❖ Addressing radicalisation in prisons https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/counter-terrorism-and-radicalisation/prevention-radicalisation/radicalisation-prisons-rehabilitation-and-reintegration_en

and;


- ❖ Promoting inclusive society, education and EU common values;
- ❖ Boosting research, evidence building, monitoring and networks: <https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/area/security> (European Commission, 2020).

Whilst the resources listed above can be used to inform the development of P/CVE strategies and training in European universities, it is also useful to example some examples of policies and approaches at national levels. For example, similarly to the UK, following attacks in Paris in 2015 approaches to P/CVE in France have been characterised by a renewed emphasis on values of *liberté, égalité, fraternité* and *laïcité* (James, 2020). Perhaps the most significant of these values regarding religious expression is that of *laïcité*, which advocates for the public space and public institutions to be predominantly secular in nature (James, 2020). The wearing of conspicuous religious symbols is not permitted in public institutions in France such as schools, libraries, and government buildings (NSS, 2013). This has perhaps been most controversial regarding the impact on Muslim women through the banning of face coverings including Burqas and veils – although women are still permitted to wear a hijab or headscarf. The approach to banning religious symbols has not extended to universities but the ban on face coverings does apply. Whilst we can draw some comparisons to the UK in terms of underpinning P/CVE with values intended to prevent extremism, these have been applied in France in distinctive ways based on the emphasis on minimal religious influence and expression in public places. Although university students do have some additional freedoms in how they dress, this wider context leaves approaches to P/CVE in France much more dependent upon intelligence-led approaches.

Whilst approaches in France and the United Kingdom have primarily been focused on ideological extremisms that claim some sort of association with distorted and radicalised understandings of Islam, in Germany the focus most recently has been much more on far-right extremism. In 2021, Germany's Interior Minister acknowledged that 'right wing extremism is the greatest threat to security in our country' (Schneider, 2022). This has represented a shift in focus, with around 100 million Euros being spent nationally on combating Islamist radicalisation since 2016 (Heine & Magazzini, 2020: 23).

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Germany has a more complex legal structure as it is comprised of 16 states, which are each responsible for domestic education and security issues and police prevention, law-enforcement, questions on youth and social work and education (Mecklenburg & Anthony 2020: 12). This structure of German approaches to PVE, has implications for practice and implementation in HEIs, which is highly complex at both the strategic and operational level (Mecklenburg & Anthony 2020: 12).


Other European states have less complicated frameworks than Germany, however the role of universities in P/CVE is ambiguous. For example, Norway adopts an ‘open model’ to Higher Education, where universities have little or no restrictions on access for the public and freedom of speech and academic freedom is situated at the centre of academic life. As such, students are allowed and encouraged to participate in ideological, political, and religious debates (Wille, 2017: 8). The emphasis on academic freedom is built into the *Act of Higher Education* (2010), but this can be contested where there might be a breach of the wider national and EU legislation on security (Wille, 2017: 8). Within this model, HEIs draw upon an advisory body overseen by the Minister of Education and Research and that provides tools and strategies intended to prevent extremism (Wille 2017: 24). However, the Norwegian model maintains an emphasis on academic freedom, with the Minister of Education and Research stating that ‘*it is not the task of the university to monitor students and keep records of those with radical views, and this is definitely not something we want for the future either*’ (Wille, 2017: 24).

The case of Turkey sees a more robust integration of universities into wider P/CVE initiatives. The Ministry of Families and Social Affairs initiated a *Strategy for the Protection of Children and Youth against Criminality*, which requires participation from a range of social service organisations, non-government organisations and universities (HRC 2015). The initiative comprises preventive coaching services; awareness raising among education professionals and workers against violence; research centres (HRC, 2015). The Ministry of National Education also mandates that any courses on religion and ethics favour respect for human being, her/his life, thoughts, and liberty, for different religions and beliefs, importance of peace, Islam as a religion of peace, importance of living in harmony with society (HRC, 2015). In the context of Portugal, a comparable structure has been adopted, with their *National Counter Terrorism Strategy* (2015), underpinning a youth, peace, and security agenda (United Nations, 2022). This framework has seen the ‘development of prevention plans, intervention in the sectors of education, training, and youth work, is critical to develop a critical sense among young people and boosting an educational approach geared towards education for citizenship.’ Whilst there have been some cases where university students have been arrested on suspicion of planning acts of extremism, these instances have ordinarily resulted from intelligence-led policing rather than referral from Higher Education institutions.

Whilst the picture of P/CVE policies and frameworks relevant to universities in Europe is far from uniform, this largely comes down to the variable expectations of Higher Education Institutions to have an active role in identifying radicalisation and risks of extremism. In European states where there are more rigid expectations, such as the Prevent statutory duty in the UK, there are several commonalities in factors which have been considered as indicators that students may be being drawn into extremism:

- *Students having accessed or been known to engage with materials which embody extremist ideologies,*





- *Students who may have experienced exposure to conflict zones and related trauma,*
- *Students who demonstrate intolerance towards individuals of ethnic or cultural backgrounds different to their own,*
- *Students appearing to recall scripted extremist narratives,*
- *Students demonstrating behaviour changes in relation to local working definitions of extremism in policy/training/guidelines.*

Perhaps one of the most significant challenges facing all European Universities lies in striking the balance between universities as spaces within which to explore intellectual ideas and as public institutions with a responsibility to protect individuals and the public from the potential harms of extremism. Having provided an overview of legislative frameworks in European states, the toolkit next moves onto responses to concerns about violent extremism on HEI campuses.


Thinking Point. What about Freedom of Speech in the Higher Educational Classroom - does holding extremist views always lead to violent extremism?



This is an important question to think about, either alone, with colleagues and also students. There are debates around the extent to which ideas, beliefs or views necessarily lead to action – in this case violent extremism. In the UK, in 2022 the *Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill* imposed new legal duties to protect freedom of speech at universities and colleges have been announced by the Education Secretary. The Bill claims to act to safeguard academic debate and the prevention of students, and others involved with HEIs, having their legitimate opinions and views silenced. It places conditions on higher educational institutions registered with the regulator, the *Office for Students*, in terms of protecting freedom of speech, and fines can be imposed for failing to do so. freedom of speech does not mean freedom to break the law. However, the new duties only relate to lawful freedom of speech. Protecting lawful free speech is different to allowing harassment and unlawful discrimination or inciting others to violence or terrorism, all of which are not acceptable or legal.

As stated above, holding beliefs is not a problem. The issue arises in the articulation of beliefs that could incite or produce harm for others. Whilst there is a fine line to draw, HEI strategic leaders, managers, teaching, and other staff, need to have discussions about what this means in practice and plan forward in relation to potential scenarios.





Section 5: Planning for the Threat of Violent Extremist Events on HE Campuses

Before we begin this section, please note that the ways of responding to violent extremism outlined below **are not designed**:

- to be relevant in an immediate emergency,
- to overrule any planning and procedures that your HEI already has in place and that you are mandated/expected to follow.

Agreed policies, practices, and procedures, must structure your response to any incident. However, what is offered here is for organisations that do not have a policy or are developing responses, and the team suggest ways of response that might be useful to consider in terms of ways of working and strategic and operational planning around possible violent extremist events.

In all cases where there is imminent threat to life, limb, or wellbeing, you should always follow your main university procedures, for instance, in relation to protocols for the evacuation of buildings and alerting the Police, your HEI security team, senior management, and so forth. **This section is not designed to offer an alternative to those established and expected routes to emergency response of your own university.** However, it might help you to think through developing such responses if you do not already have them in place.

What to Do If Extremism is Suspected on Campus?


In any case where there is imminent threat to life, limb, or wellbeing, you should follow your main University procedures, for instance in the evacuation of buildings, alerting the Police, your HEI security team, Senior Management and so forth. This section is not designed to offer an alternative to those established and expected routes to emergency response.

We have distilled information from a variety of sources to identify what you might do if you believe organised extremism is happening on campus, and provided some illustrations of responses:

Emergency Responses to incidents

Again, before discussing this, it is imperative to reiterate that your own HEI protocols, policies, and practices must be priority and be followed. Below are outlined some resources that you can use to think about responses to specific types of severe threat and risk that might arise in relation to violent extremism on campus. There are other resources available online too and you will probably have a designated officer or individual who focuses upon security responses. It is vital that you liaise with them for further information, if you have any concerns about a violent incident occurring on your campus or concerns about individuals or groups, etc.





Shooting, Knife or other Serious Incidents

Sadly, the use of weapons in educational organisations is a scenario that has been seen in countries across the globe. The College and University Professional Association for Human Resources, located in the USA, has a resource on preparing for and responding to active shooting incidents on campuses, written by Kline (2015) and updated in 2019. This information is based on Florida State University policy around active shooting incident on campus. For further information please see these web materials at: <https://www.cupahr.org/blog/how-to-prepare-for-and-respond-to-an-active-shooter-incident-on-campus/> This section also has integrated best practice from diverse sources (listed below) to offer a call to action for HEIs:

Before suggesting ways of response, a note must be added about preparation and inclusion of different types of staff in response training. HEI senior management teams will, typically, regularly consider and plan for threats of extremism, risk on campus and their management. Whilst most other staff will not be aware, Vice Chancellors and their directorate teams will, more-likely-than-not, have had contact with government and security agencies around safety and the threat of terrorism, as well as receiving regular updates on risk levels. However, commonly this information is not passed down to other staff, which might lead them to believe there is no planning around this. Lack of sharing on this information might be justified on a 'need to know' basis and there might be the assumption that only very senior staff and security need be involved. However, in terms of detecting and identifying suspicious activity or possible events underway, it may be very useful to have a co-ordinated and inclusive response across staff groups. If an incident occurs, wide groups are likely to be impacted and need to act. The 'need to know' approach and its possible consequences are matters that staff at strategic levels of HEIs must consider.

Although little is written on this subject, it is imperative that as part of general risk and safety protocols there is consideration of extremism in situ, in the classroom, library, online and in the other spaces/places of HEIs. For instance, lecturers, professors and administrators are rarely helped to understand how to manage face-to-face incidents where extremism is raised. There is a case for help with this, as well as clear lines of communication in the event of incidents occurring where staff are concerned about things they have heard said or seen in the course of their duties.


With the point above borne in mind, below is a summary of relevant aspects/points for thinking/planning around possible violent extremism events on campuses for European HEIs.

1. Forward Planning and Preparation is Vital for all Serious Incidents.

Most HEIs are used to having fire drills and training offered to staff in relation to fire on campus is often mandatory. However, this is not the case in relation to extremism outrages or potential other serious incidents on campus. Using material from the USA and other countries, these show it is **important to ensure that all staff are aware of diverse issues that might occur on campus**. Even where such events have not happened or happen very infrequently, this does not obviate the need to consider what might be done if an incident arises. **The main message for European HEIs is the need to raise staff awareness of the potential of a violent extremist incident.**

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Such an incident may require staff to use different skills or know how to mobilise to deal with a threat. Just to note, for instance, in the UK, one of the CHECK IT team was an academic in Manchester in the mid-1990s and was trained how to receive and respond to a bomb threat coming directly into academic offices by telephone. At that time, it was believed that such threats were high in the UK and that HEIs could be a target and/or may be used to disperse information prior to a bomb incident. All staff were trained on collection of information on receiving a call and gaining relevant information, how to respond, and who to contact immediately after. Such training or preparation will, most likely, not need to be used, but nevertheless, is vital to ensure safety. In fact, in the case of Manchester, there was a major bomb incident less than two years after this training, with 220 people injured, a warning call was received by the regional television station.

Preparation also includes **ensuring that all security systems and security staff are aware and trained in risks**. This is more likely to already take place because of the specific focus of these staff roles in securing the campus.

However, there is often a disconnection between security/security staff and other groups of staff who need to be aware of the issues. In the case of a serious incident, it is likely that staff other than security might witness the start of an incident or will be first on the scene – therefore, it makes sense to train wider staff groups beyond designated security staff.


2. **Check Communications Systems.** Would all staff know where/who to call if they spotted something suspicious or if they believed that an active attack was underway? Old phone details on the web or in hard copy documents can mean that rapid response in raising awareness with senior staff and relevant others can be difficult. **Ensure communications systems, structures and protocols are in order and that staff knowledge of who to contact and how.**

Part of checking these systems is to **evaluate and test how one would get the word out to wider groups that there was an incident**. In one shooting incident, which occurred in a local school near to a campus, one team CHECK IT team member recalls email being used to send a message out to all staff. This was not efficient at the time because email was less used. Some staff did not become aware of the matter until hours later. Use of email and other forms of **alarms or warnings should be tested in terms of efficacy**, and policy developed about how such incidents might be communicated to wide staff and student groups to ensure awareness and safety.

3. **Ensure staff and student support availability in the aftermath of an incident.** Thinking ahead is not just about planning and awareness raising but thinking about **trauma support** and ensuring that staff and students are well taken care of, should anything happen. This might mean:

Harnessing immediate onsite or close to site, forms of support. Mobilising resources already on campus when an incident has just happened, for example deploying counselling services and psychology/psychotherapy department staff for immediate support or reaching out to local authority/community partners to increase helping capacity. Such partners might include public or private health providers, NGOs that deal with victim support or trauma, faith organisations





and so forth. The main issue is to ensure that details of such networks of support are identified and kept on file in case they are required.

Using onsite or close-to-site forms of support to provide ongoing help/cover. Responses around violent extremism or other extreme situations, may well mean ensuring sustained programmes of help for students and staff. Whilst many HEIs in the UK, for instance, offer telephone employee assistance, in specific traumatic incidents, care should be taken to offer more appropriate face-to-face and diverse forms of help for staff and students. In other words, it is unlikely to be enough to offer a telephone advice line. Again, as with immediate threats it will be vital to turn to other local sources of help, such as community organisations, NGOs/the voluntary sector and/or public services.

4. **Enhancing media engagement planning.** For senior management in universities specifically, **engagement with the media around an incident will be expected and necessary.** Planning out how this might happen and ensuring there are designated staff who are able to engage with the media is essential. Often a spokesperson will not be enough and **someone at senior level might need to be trained** to take on this role in an extreme incident.
5. **Post-incident Review and Planning.** Having processes in place to ensure **evaluation and learning** will be important for future development and improved response. This evaluation needs to be swift and robust to ensure a focus on improved forward planning and response in future.

Planning against violent extremist incidents needs, ideally, to involve all staff across institutions to be effective; this is an evolving and developing process that requires diverse skills, voices, and viewpoints. It is also vital to communicate to all staff the importance of planning for possible events. Because events are not common, it can be hard to convey that importance, but it is vital. As noted at the start of this resource, from a risk assessment point of view, whilst actual events on campuses are low, the potential impact of an incident occurring is high.

Question: what could you do to address extremism and its potential impact in your HEI?


Think about how you might make a difference in bringing the issue of campus safety in relation to extremism into wider debate in your institution.



Comment: for some readers, you will be aware that raising any kind of sensitive topic in your HEI is not possible. In some countries, the issues are too sensitive or, according to accepted ideas of who-does-what, it is not in the remit of some staff to be able to raise such concerns. You may be in that position, but you may feel that something can be done and that you are able to contribute. For instance, you might have thought about whether you can raise the matter in your faculty, or at a university governance forum or similar, etc. You might feel


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that this is something you wish to speak with your employment union about, or that this is a topic that might be suitable for smaller staff gatherings, to raise debates and discussion. We hope that the ideas here will enable you to feel better able to think about current practice, engage in these ways, raise concerns, and contribute to ways forward in planning around preventing extremism on campus.






Section 6: Concluding Comments

This toolkit has served to raise awareness and understanding of violent extremism. This has included discussion of the:

- *policy and practice meanings in use in Europe,*
- *the debates around terminology and issues relating to violent extremism,*
- *basic understandings of debates around radicalisation,*
- *Understanding of the diverse ideas around violent extremism in different countries, which might impact on HEI staff practice,*
- *thinking about preparedness and response*

In all these areas, the aim has been to encourage thinking around how HEIs might be impacted by violent extremism and what this might mean for your practice, that of your colleagues and the policies and strategies of your higher education institution. The toolkit is not the last word on this subject are, it is a springboard and requires readers to go and examine issues in their own country. It is recognised that countries will be at different stages of development in relation to planning and response to violent extremism, but the CHECK IT HE project team hope the resource will enable debates and discussion to be instigated. It is particularly important that these happen not only at high levels of HEIs but amongst all staff – the safeguarding of HEIs from violent extremism and risk is a core responsibility of all.






Resource on Campus Safety:

Campus Safety Magazine – including video material that addresses current threats on campuses and responses. Available at:
<https://www.campussafetymagazine.com/university/addressing-extremist-campus/>





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
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
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
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
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
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Appendix 1

Cases to Think Through with Colleagues or Alone – How might you respond?

Dr Habib is taking a seminar group when a conversation arises about students known by the seminar participants who they state are watching xenophobic videos and using hate terms. The students state that these peers are being effected by influencers from the far right but are concerned there might be risks to the campus or other communities.

It is really important to take a measured approach here. Dr Habib is hearing second-hand about possible incidents. Dr Habib is reliant upon what she is being told at this point but has not heard/seen these things herself. In this case, writing down all the details that the students have said and referral to senior management is urgent. However, there would be no need to respond as if the threat was happening on the campus at this time.

Dr Habib is on campus in a classroom when she hears a student speaking on a mobile phone in the corridor. The student says they have a sharp (knife) with them and that they want to slash up trans students on the campus.

In this case, Dr Habib has heard a threat made herself. Dr Habib has no means of knowing if the student is serious, but the targets have been identified and they have said they have the means with them to cause harm (a knife). This would be a case for security to be contacted immediately.

